

Excessive data extraction as an abuse of dominance: how and why?

giorgio.monti@eui.eu




Synthetic representation of the double-side market applied to digital data

Source: AGCOM Big Data Interim Report (2018)



Synthetic representation of the double-side market applied to digital data

Source: AGCOM Big Data Interim Report (2018)



Synthetic representation of the double-side market applied to digital data

Source: AGCOM Big Data Interim Report (2018)

"So more users more information, more information more users, more advertisers more users, more users, more advertisers, it's a beautiful thing, lather, rinse repeat, that's what I do for a living."

Jonathan Rosenberg, former Google Senior Vice President of Product Management and Marketing (2008) quoted in *Google/Android* fn.943

Excessive data extraction as an abuse of dominance: the German way

FB is dominant in the 'private social network market'

- Excludes YouTube, Snapchat, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Instagram
- 95% of daily active users

Abuse: collection of off-FB data & integration with FB data

- Exploitation of users: breach of GDPR (ineffective consent) + dominance = abuse
 - Data collection does not harm consumer economically as data can be duplicated
 - Consumer failure to notice use of data is due to their preference not to FB dominance → no causal link btw dominance and abuse/breach of GDPR
 - CF consumer lock-in/network effects at the time of policy change?
- Exclusionary potential: more data raises entry barriers

EU Competition Law Option 1: Excessive price analogy

UBC: expensive Chiquita bananas

- Difference between costs & price is excessive
- Price unfair
 - a) in itself or
 - b) compared to other products

'other ways may be devised, and economic theorists have not failed to think up of several, of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a product is unfair'

FB: taking too much data

- 1. Difference btw benefits to users and amount of data
- 2. FB data extraction policy
 - a) Abuse in itself (GDPR reference)
 - b) Compared to other platforms

Value v price Abuse > GDPR

EU Competition Law Option 2: Unfair terms

BRT v SABAM: collecting society & authors

Balance: freedom of authors & effective management of copyright for all members

imposes on its members obligations which are not absolutely necessary for the attainment of [the collecting society's] object ... encroach unfairly upon a member's freedom to exercise his copyright

Applied in B2C context?

Balance: right to data v FB business model

- Imposing on customer data extraction policies not necessary for:
 - FB business model as a 2-sided platform
- Customer's freedom to exercise right over their data v FB business model: balance
 - GDPR as a benchmark? (e.g. data minimization; awareness of extent of data collection)

EU Competition Law Option 3: exclusionary effects

Google/Android

- Smartphone OEMS wanting to install Google Play Store must also install Google Search
 - Tying as an abuse of dominance
 - Excludes rival smartphone search apps


Among the anticompetitive effects

 (976) Google's conduct prevents competing general search services to gain search queries and the respective revenues and data needed to improve their services


Lesson

 A data-rich platform acquiring ever more data may foreclose other rivals keen to secure that data

Excessive data extraction as a competition infringement: why?



Excessive data extraction as a competition infringement: why?



BKA Facebook

Excessive data extraction as a competition infringement: why?

